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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
The present Washington case law is inconsistent concerning such a
construction. The Income Properties case indicates a willingness by the
court to exercise its inherent equitable powers and thus accomplish
what was done in New York by statute. Young v. Riley does not over-
rule Income Properties, but does take a contrary position. The prece-
dential value of Young is only greater because of its more recent origin.
Whether it implicitly overrules Income Properties remains to be deter-
mined if and when both cases are argued to the court.
EvAw L. SciwA
PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Sanctions for Enforcement of Discovery-Constitutionality of
Rule 37. The Washington Supreme Court recently heard Mitchell v.
Watson,1 a case of first impression concerning the interpretation, ap-
plication, and constitutionality of Rule of Pleading, Practice and
Procedure 37.2 The principles derived from the decision have an im-
1158 Wash. Dec. 194, 361 P2d 744 (1961).
aWAsH. RPPP 37: "Refusal to make discovery: Consequences, (a) Refusal to
Answer. If a party or other deponent refuses to answer any question propounded upon
oral examination, the examination shall be completed on other matters or adjourned, as
the proponent of the question may prefer. Thereafter, on reasonable notice to all
persons affected thereby, he may apply to the court in the county where the deposition
is taken for an order compelling an answer. Upon the refusal of a deponent to answer
any interrogatory submitted under Rule 31 or upon the refusal of a party to answer
any interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, the proponent of the question may on
like notice make like application for such an order. If the motion is granted, and if
the court finds that the refusal was without substantial justification the court shall
require the refusing party or deponent and the party or attorney advising the refusal
or either of them to pay to the examining party the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney's fees. If the motion is
denied and if the court finds that the motion was made without substantial justification,
the court shall require the examining party or the attorney advising the motion or both
of them to pay to the refusing party or witness the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees.
"(b) Failure to Comply with Order. (1) Contempt. If a party or other witness
refuses to be sworn or refuses to answer any question after being directed to do so by
the court in the county in which the deposition is being taken, the refusal may be
considered a contempt of that court.
"(2) Other Consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party
refuses to obey an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule requiring him to
answer designated questions, or an order made under Rule 34 to produce any document
or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be donej or
to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 35 requiring
him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders
in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:
"(i) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked or the
character or description of the thing or land or the contents of the paper, or the physical
or mental condition of the party, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party
obtaining the order;
"(ii) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose desig-
nated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated
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portant impact upon the successful implementation of Rule 37 in
Washington.
Emmett Watson, defendant in a libel action, appealed from a con-
tempt order entered in the trial court. Watson had been served written
interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33.V Upon failure to answer the inter-
rogatories, pursuant to Rule 37, Watson was adjudged in contempt.
The contempt order: (1) adjudged Watson guilty of contempt of
court; (2) struck the answer of defendants Watson; (3) entered judg-
ment by default against them on all issues, except the amount of
documents or things or items of testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical
or mental condition;
"(iii) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof or staying further proceed-
ings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
"(iv) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order directing
the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders except
an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
"(c) Expenses on Refusal to Admit. If a party, after being served with a request
under Rule 36 to admit the genuineness of any documents or the truth of any matters
of fact, serves a sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the admissions there-
after proves the genuineness of any such document or the truth of any such matter of
fact, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the
reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof including reasonable attorney's fees.
Unless the court finds that there were good reasons for the denial or that the admissions
sought were of no substantial importance, the order shall be made.
"(d) Failure of Party to Attend or Serve Answers. If a party or an officer or man-
aging agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his
deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to inter-
rogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of such interrogatories, the
court on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that
party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by
default against that party."3 WA SH. RPPP 33: Interrogatories to parties. Any party may serve upon any
adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the
party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association, by any
officer or agent who shall furnish such information as is available to the party. Inter-
rogatories may be served after commencement of the action and without leave of
court, except that, if service is made by the plaintiff within ten days after such com-
mencement, leave of court granted with or without notice must first be obtained. The
interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. The
answers shall be signed by the person making them; and the party upon whom the
interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party
submitting the interrogatories within fifteen days after the service of the interroga-
tories, unless the court, on motion and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges or
shortens the time. Within ten days after service of interrogatories a party may serve
written objections thereto together with a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest
practicable time. Answers to interrogatories to which objection is made shall be
deferred until the time the objections are determined.
"Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under Rule
26(b), and the answers may be used to the same extent as provided in Rule 26(d) for
the use of the deposition of a party. Interrogatories may be served after a deposition
has been taken, and a deposition may be sought after interrogatories have been
answered, but the court, on motion of the deponent or the party interrogated, may
make such protective order as justice may require. The number of interrogatories or
of sets of interrogatories to be served is not limited except as justice requires to protect
the party from annoyance, expense, embarrassment, or oppression. The provisions
of Rule 30(b) are applicable for the protection of the party from whom answers to
interrogatories are sought under this rule."
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damages to be awarded plaintiffs; (4) prohibited defendants Watson
from participating in the trial for damages "in any manner whatsoever
until Emmett Watson complies with the lawful orders of this Court";
and (5) awarded plaintiffs' lawyers judgment for $200 attorney's fees
against defendants Watson.
The refusal to answer was wilful. Watson refused to answer the
interrogatories when propounded to him by counsel in open court and
also upon direction to answer by the judge. The interrogatories asked
the name and business address of the man from whom he purportedly
received information for a story published in a Seattle daily newspaper.4
Plaintiffs' contention was that such information was libelous and that
they had sustained damages as a result of the publication. Upon appeal,
the supreme court held that the contempt order, insofar as it struck
Watson's answer and entered judgment by default, was void as a de-
privation of property without due process of law.
Rule 37 provides for the application of certain designated sanctions
when a party or deponent fails to comply with a discovery request.
Administration of these sanctions is subject to constitutional limitations.
CONSTITUTIONALITY Or FEDERAL RULE 3 7
Washington's rules of pleading, practice and procedure are substan-
tially the same as the federal rules. The advisory committee on the
federal rules noted' that the constitutional application of Rule 37 is
to be in the light of two leading cases, Hovey v. Elliott' and Hammond
Packing Co. v. Arkansas.'
- Interrogatories propounded to Watson:
"1. Referring to the subject of interrogation in your deposition of March 22, 1957, at
page 10, line 23, and following: from how many persons or person did you obtain the
information which was the basis for your insertion in your column 'This Our City' of
the material alleged herein to be libelous?
"2. What are the names and addresses of each of the persons involved in your answer
to interrogatory number one?
"3. What are the occupations and business addresses of each of said people?"
After a show cause hearing, but before entry of the contempt order, Watson filed an
affidavit in which he stated, "I desire to answer Interrogatory No. 1 by stating: 'one
man' and Interrogatory No. 3 (in part) by stating 'occupation of law enforcement.'
I respectfully decline to answer Interrogatory No. 2 and the remainder of No. 3."
G Notes on Advisory Committee on the Rules, Rule 37, 28 U.S.C., p. 4325 (1952
ed.) : "The provisions of this rule authorizing orders establishing facts or excluding
evidence or striking pleadings, or authorizing judgments of dismissal or default, for
refusal to answer questions or permit inspection or otherwise make discovery, are
in accord with Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas which distinguishes between the
justifiable use of such measures as a means of compelling the production of evidence,
and their unjustifiable use, as in Hovey v. Elliott, for the mere purpose of punishing
for contempt." (Citations omitted.)
G167 U.S. 409 (1897).
7212 U.S. 322 (1909).
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In Hovey, the defendants were ordered to pay over a sum of money
into the court registry. Upon failure to comply, the defendants were
found in contempt of court. Defendants' pleadings were struck and a
default judgment entered. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, Justice White posed the question:
whether a court possessing plenary power to punish for contempt,
unlimited by statute, has the right to summon a defendant to answer,
and then after obtaining jurisdiction by the summons, refuse to allow
the party summoned to answer or strike his answer from the files,
suppress the testimony in his favor, and condemn him without con-
sideration thereof, and without a hearing, on the theory that he has
been guilty of a contempt of court. The mere statement of this proposi-
tion would seem, in reason and conscience, to render imperative a
negative answer. The fundamental conception of a court of justice is
condemnation only after hearing.8 (Emphasis added.)
The court order did not concern the merits of the case. Rather, it
merely ordered the defendants to follow a court procedure. The default
judgment entered as punishment for contempt was found to be void
for want of due process. A party must have the opportunity to be
heard in his own behalf before condemnation in order to secure the
constitutional right of due process.
Eleven years later the Hovey doctrine was refined and limited in the
Hammond case. The defendant company had been ordered to produce
witnesses and records at a deposition proceeding. The trial court
granted a motion to strike defendant's pleadings and to enter a default
judgment after defendant had failed to comply with the discovery
order. The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing such pro-
cedure was constitutional. Justice White, again speaking for the court,
distinguished the Hovey doctrine as follows:
Is the doctrine of Hovey v. Elliott here applicable? .... The essential
basis for the exercise of power. . . is the criterion by which its validity
is to be measured. Hovey v. Elliott involved a denial of all right to defend
as mere punishment. This case presents a failure by the defendant to
produce what we must assume was material evidence in its possession
and a resulting striking out of an answer and a default. The proceeding
here taken may therefore find its sanction in the undoubted right of the
lawmaking power to create a presumption of fact as to the bad faith and
untruth of an answer begotten from the suppression or failure to produce
the proof ordered, when such proof concerned the rightful decision of the
8167 U.S. at 413.
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cause. In a sense, of course, the striking out of the answer and default was
a punishment, but it was only remotely so, as the generating source of
the power was the right to create a presumption flowing from the failure
to produce. The difference between mere punishment, as illustrated in
Hovey v. Elliott, and the power exerted in this is as follows: In the
former due process of law was denied by the refusal to hear. In this the
preservation of due process was secured by the presumption that the
refusal to produce evidence material to the administration of due process
was but an admission of the want of mierit in the asserted defense."
(Emphasis added.)
This case created the "punishment" and "presumption" concepts which
have been used by subsequent courts."0 In Hammond the Court was
explicit in pointing out that the "presumption" concept is only appli-
cable where the refusal to produce concerned evidence material to the
administration of due process. The evidence sought in Hammond went
to all the issues raised by the pleadings. Therefore, a default judgment
cannot be entered unless the failure to produce goes to matters which
are the essence of the case. However, this does not preclude appli-
cation of lesser sanctions as provided by Federal Rule 37.
The Hovey doctrine has been further refined by the recent Societe
0 212 U.S. at 350.
10 Cases concerning Federal Rule 37 and following the Hammond doctrine: Bourne,
Inc. v. Romero, 23 F.R.D. 292 (D. La. 1959) (default judgment upheld); Loosley v.
Stone, 15 F.R.D. 373 (D. Ill. 1954) (complaint dismissed; upheld); Duell v. Duell.
178 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (default judgment reversed); Peitzman v. City of
Illmo, 141 F2d 956 (8th Cir. 1944) (striking of answer upheld). Other cases fol-
lowing Hammond doctrines: National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold,
348 U.S. 37 (1954); Wittenberg Coal Co. v. Compagnie Havraise Peninsulare De
Navigation A Vapeur, 22 F2d 904 (2d Cir. 1927).
31 Feingold v. Walworth Bros., 238 N.Y. 446, 144 N.E. 675, 678 (1924). The
court stated: "When a defendant refuses to produce books and papers relating to the
merits of the action, he may be deprived of the right to assert that, as far as they
relate to the merits of the action, he has a good defense. The presumption arises that a
failure to produce such evidence is an admission that it exists. The punishment is for
withholding proof and is properly limited to exclude what the proof presumptively
establishes. But to punish generally for a refusal to produce by striking out an entire
answer, which not only puts in issue all the material allegations of the complaint, but
includes affirmative defenses, comes perilously near the denial of due process .... The
power to punish is limited by the presumption which attaches to the suppression of
the evidence suppressed."
An excellent interpretation of Federal Rule 37 appears in Bernat v. Pennsylvania
tR., 14 F.R.D. 465 (D. Penn. 1953). The court stated at 465: "In a case where the
refusal to produce a document makes it impossible for the plaintiff to prepare or
present his case. a default judgment would be the proper remedy. However, the rule
provides for a number of consequences of varying degrees of severity and I think it
is clearly intended that the court should fit the penalty to the nature and effects of the
refusal. Of course, in refusing to obey the order of the court defendant takes a calcu-
lated risk, but it is plain, that it was not intended that he should automatically incur
a default judgment in every case." But see, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74
HARv. L. Rrv. 940, 990 (1961).
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Internationale case. 2 The Court held that bad faith or wilfulness 2
must accompany the failure to comply with a discovery order before
the more drastic sanctions of Rule 37(b) (2) apply.
WASHINGTON PRIOR TO RULE 37
RCW 5.04.0604 (abrogated and superseded by Rule 37 in 1957)
since 1854 provided for sanctions similar to those of Rule 37. The
constitutionality of the statute was tested in Lawson v. Black Diamond
Coal Mining Co."5 The court set the same limitations upon the appli-
cation of sanctions as did Hovey and Hammond.
If the sanction was imposed merely as punishment such imposition
would be unconstitutional. To determine if the imposition was mere
punishment, the discovery request must be read in light of the relation-
ship between the information desired and the issues in the case. The
default judgment sanction was limited to apply only when there was a
failure to make discovery of material facts relating to substantially
all the issues in the case. 16
IMPLEmENTATION OF WASHINGTON RULE 37
The court in Mitchell expressly followed the principles derived from
the foregoing cases. The following principles constitute the framework
in which Washington Rule 37 will be implemented:
12 Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
13 See Brookdale Mill v. Rawley, 218 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1954). The court stated
that a sillful violation of a provision of a rule is any conscious or intentional failure to
comply, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary non-compliance. A wrongful
intent need not be shown to make such a failure willful.
See also, Cardox Corp. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 23 F.R.D. 27 (D. Ill.
1958); United Sheeplined Clothing Co. v. Arctic Fur Cap Corp., 165 F. Supp. 193
(D.N.Y. 1958); Forde v. Urania Transportation, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 240 (D.N.Y.
1958) ; Haskell v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 19 F.R.D. 356 (D. Penn. 1956) ;
Grimmett v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 11 F.R.D. 335 (D. Ohio 1951); Roth
v. Paramount Pictures Distributing Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31 (D. Penn. 1948).
Before the Societe Internationtale decision there had been much confusion as to
the presence of the word "willfully" in Federal Rule 37(d) and its absence from
Federal Rule 37(b). See Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58
CoLum L. Rav. 480, 489-496 (1958) for an enlightening criticism of Federal Rule 37.
14RCV 5.04.060 provided that: "If a party refuses to attend and testify at the
trial, or to be examined upon a commission, or to answer any interrogatories filed, his
complaint, answer, or reply may be stricken out, and judgment taken against him, and
he may also, in the discretion of the court, be proceeded against as in other cases for
a contempt: Provided, That the preceding sections shall not be construed so as to
compel any person to answer any question, where such answer may tend to incriminate
himself." RCW 5.04.060 was repealed by Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 50, § 1.
15 44 Wash. 26, 86 Pac. 1120 (1906).
-6 See Anderson v. Stanwood, 178 Ore. 306, 167 P.2d 315 (1946). The court
stated at 319: ... the validity of an order striking a pleading pursuant to the statute
under consideration is restricted to those cases where the failure to answer obviously
withholds a fact or facts material to his adversary's case and is limited to the effect
[VOL. 37
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(a) A defendant who refused to make discovery may be adjudged in
contempt of court and punished.1 7 (Citations omitted.)
(b) The court may, as "other consequences,... make such orders in
regard to the refusal as are just..."; but cannot deny to defendant
his right to defend the action as "mere punishment." Defendant
cannot be deprived of a constitutional right.
(c) The purpose of the court's order shall be to balance the rights of
the parties so that the contemptor does not profit or benefit from his
contemptuous act.
(d) The court may presume and infer, as a matter of law, that the evi-
dence withheld by defendant would if produced, contradict the
contemptor's contentions and support the contentions of plaintiff.
The truth of matters thus presumed to be established may result in
drastically limiting defendant's proof or in striking all or part of
pleaded defenses ......
The court summarily applied the foregoing principles. Watson's
refusal to answer the interrogatory was clearly intentional. Had he
identified the alleged source of his information, the plaintiffs could
have produced him for impeachment purposes. A defendant, in an
action for damages for publication of an article libelous per se, may
introduce evidence in mitigation of damages.1 9 The court stated:
If, upon remand of the instant case, the trial court indulges the pre-
sumption that defendant Watson, by his refusal to answer, admits that
there was no such informant, or that the unidentified person did not
make the statement, then the trial court is free to reject any and all
evidence of mitigation of damages or other proffered defenses which are
relevant to or have any reasonable connection with the existence of the
alleged informer.20
A close analysis of the court's disposition sustains the conclusion
that Rule 37 was properly interpreted and applied. The default judg-
ment entered by the trial court can only be construed as punishment
for contempt. The gist of the unanswered interrogatories related to the
damage issue only. The existence of the alleged informer concerns
the case to the extent that such fact is relevant to the mitigation of
that ensues from any reasonable presumption which may be drawn from the refusal
to discover such fact or facts." (Emphasis added.) A discovery request must entail
material facts; otherwise, such request will be open to objection. I.E.S. Corporation
v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 559, 283 P2d 700 (1955) ; Elster v. American Airlines,
Inc., 34 Del. 505, 106 A.2d 516 (1954).
17 State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 349 P.2d 210 (1960); Keller v. Keller, 52 Wn2d
84, 323 P.2d 231 (1958).18 Mitchell v. Watson, 158 Wash. Dec. 194, 204, 361 P.2d 744, 750 (1961).19 Farrar v. Tribune Publishing Co., 157 Wash. Dec. 447, 358 P.2d 792 (1961).
20 158 Wash. Dec. at 205, 361 P.2d at 750-51.
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damages. Since the desired answers are relegated to a negligible posi-
tion, striking of defendant's answer and foreclosure of all the issues
against him is condemnation without a prior hearing. This procedure
is repugnant to the fourteenth amendment and void for lack of due
process. Application of the lesser sanction, depriving defendant from
introducing evidence concerning the alleged informer, is consonant
with constitutional principles. In this regard Watson's contumacious
conduct is treated as an admission that the alleged informer does not
exist. This is a presumption in which the court can constitutionally
indulge. However, before such an admission can be presumed, such
fact must be significant to an issue in the case."
FUTURE APPLICATION OF WASHINGTON RULE 37
Although counsel moves under Rule 37, the application of the sanc-
tions is primarily left to the discretion of the trial judge.22 It is the
trial judge's duty to administer the rule so that its full impact is felt.
Rule 37 was promulgated to assure that the discovery process would
function properly. Sanctions are provided to discourage and minimize
noncompliance. In order for the process to work properly, the sanctions
imposed must be adequate to effectively discourage noncompliance.
The trial judge must be advised of the context in which the noncompli-
ance arises. He must know fully the circumstances relating to the
noncompliance. The importance of the facts requested must be bal-
anced against the reasons for noncompliance.
Rule 37 has been plagued with an apparent doctrinal impediment.
The keynote of the new rules is "get to the trial on the merits." A case
should not turn on a procedural technicality. However, Rule 37 makes
such a result possible by default or dismissal. The rules have attempted
to remedy this conflict by allowing the trial judge discretion to select
from a broad array of sanctions of graduated severity. Yet, while the
courts have been armed with such sanctions, it appears that many
violations of discovery procedure have been excused.2" The trial judge
instilled with the spirit of getting to trial on the merits has lost sight
21 Otherwise such an interrogatory would be open to objection. See cases at note
16, supra.
22 Mitchell v. Johnson, 274 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Craig v. Far West Eng'r Co.,
265 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1959) ; White Pine Copper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 166
F. Supp. 148 (D. Mich. 1958); Interchemical Corp. v. Uncas Printing & Finishing
Co., 39 NJ. Super. 318, 120 A.2d 880 (1956); United States v. Costello, 222 F.2d
656 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Michigan Window Cleaning Co., v. Martino, 173 F2d 466 (6th
Cir. 1949); Valenstein v. Bayonne Bolt Corp., 6 F.R.D. 363 (D.N.Y. 1946).2 3 Austin Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 302 (D.N.Y.
1958) ; Grimmett v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 11 F.R.D. 335 (D. Ohio, 1951).
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of the purpose of discovery. "The principle result is that Rule 37 has
been relegated too often to the station of 'merely another procedural
technicality' to be lived with or tolerated, rather than respected and
observed." '24 On the other hand, there is the overbearing judge who
abuses his discretion by arbitrarily imposing harsh sanctions. The
whole discovery process has suffered as a result of such radical appli-
cation.
Discovery occupies an integral part of the judicial process under
the new rules.25 If the discovery process26 is to function properly, Rule
37 must be conscientously utilized to its fullest extent. Timely appli-
cation of firm but reasonable sanctions the keynote for the proper
implementation of Rule 37. RicHAD H. WILLAMS
REAL PROPERTY
Abolition of Rule in Shelley's Case-Testamentary Dispositions.
The state of title to an undetermined amount of realty in Washington
was put in question by the Washington court's decision in Rubenser v.
Felice.' That case marked the end, in Washington, of an ancient and
troublesome rule of law-the Rule in Shelley's Case ' -- in testamentary
dispositions of realty.
The Rubenser facts clearly fall within the area subject to the opera-
tion of the Rule in Shelley's Case. The effect of the Rule was stated
by the Washington court in Shufeldt v. Shufeldt as follows:
[I]f an estate for life is granted by an instrument and the remainder is
limited by the same instrument, either mediately or immediately, to the
heirs of the life tenant, the life tenant takes the remainder as well as the
life estate.4
24 Recent Innovations to Pretrial Discovery Sanctions: Rule 37 Reinterpreted.
1959 Duim L. J. 278.25 Underwood v. Maloney, 16 F.R.D. 3 (D. Penn. 1954). Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947); Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, 30 F. Supp. 275 (D.
Md. 1939).
26 See WAsr. RPPP 26-37.
1 158 Wash. Dec. 857, 365 P.2d 320 (1961).2 Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co.88b, 76 Eng. Rep. 199 (1581). The Rule was stated and
applied as early as 1324 in Abel's Case, Y.B. 18 Ed.II 577, but derived its name from
the case in which it was considered to have been best explained. 1 Am ucAN LAv oF
PRopimTY § 4.40 (Casner ed. 1952).
3130 Wash. 253, 227 Pac. 6 (1924). The Rule was not applicable to the Shnfeldt
facts, but the court made the unqualified statement that the Rule was in force in Wash-
ington. The court in that case was concerned with the construction of a will, as it was
in the Rubenser case.
4 Id. at 268, 227 Pac. at 11. The Rule is also often known as the rule against remain-
ders to the grantee's heirs.
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